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Pharmaceutical Philanthropy or
Resisting Regulations?
WHY PHARMACEUTICAL DONATIONS DO NOT
VIOLATE THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
With health care costs spiraling out of control in recent
decades, the fear of being slammed with a bill that will cost an arm
and a leg has made Americans literally risk losing that arm and
leg. Instead of going to the doctor and receiving necessary
treatment when sick or injured, a recent survey published by
NORC and West Health reported that forty percent of Americans
reported forgoing medical attention in 2018 alone due to financial
concerns.
1
Due to the complex nature of health care, the many
health care programs that the federal government has initiated
remain insufficient at resolving this crisis.
2
These programs were
designed to help groups, such as the elderly, the disabled, the
indigent, veterans, and Native Americans.
3
Although these
programs—such as Medicare and Medicaid—do provide access to
health care for over one hundred million beneficiaries,
4
they do not
guarantee affordable costs.
5
In fact, many respondents in the West
1
Press Release, NORC & West Health Inst., New Survey Finds Large Number of
People Skipping Necessary Medical Care Because of Cost (Mar. 26, 2018), http://www.norc.org/
NewsEventsPublications/PressReleases/Pages/survey-finds-large-number-of-people-skipping-
necessary-medical-care-because-cost.aspx [https://perma.cc/58FP-VY8D].
2
See, e.g., Bernie Sanders & James E. Clyburn,American Healthcare Is in Crisis.
WeMust Fight for theRealNeeds of the People, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2017, 11:44EDT), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/30/american-healthcare-bernie-sanders-james-cly
burn [https://perma.cc/83W7-VPFF]; COMM. ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY
PROGRAMS& INST. OFMED., LEADERSHIP BYEXAMPLE: COORDINATINGGOVERNMENTROLES
IN IMPROVINGHEALTHCAREQUALITY 28–29 (JanetM. Corrigan et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
LEADERSHIP BYEXAMPLE] (noting that the federal government’s six major programs serving
millions of Americans—“Medicare,Medicaid, the State Children’sHealth Insurance Program
(SCHIP), the Department of Defense TRICARE and TRICARE for Life programs (DOD
TRICARE), the Veteran’s Health Administration (VHA) program, and the Indian Health
Service (IHS) program”—require reforms across the board to improve health care quality).
3
See LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE, supra note 2, at 29.
4
Id. at 28.
5
See Hadley Heath Manning, No Matter What You Call It, Government-Run
Health Care Will Never Work, HILL (Feb. 27, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/
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Health survey reported receiving “amedical bill for something they
thought was covered by their health insurance.”
6
To make matters
worse, of the respondents that did make a trip to the doctor’s, one-
in-three reported either a failure to purchase their prescription or
use of a reduced dosage in order to save money.
7
In an effort to combat this crisis, pharmaceutical companies
have taken the initiative to absorb some of these costs.
8
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have designed financial channels,
known as patient assistance programs (PAPs), to assist patients
that need certain prescription drugs.
9
In 2006, the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Health andHuman
Services (HHS) issued an advisory opinion stating that
pharmaceutical companies would not categorically be subject to
administrative sanctions for sponsoring patient assistance
programs (PAPs).
10
Although this advisory opinion approved two
specific PAPs which provided free prescription medications to
uninsured patients and Medicare Part D enrollees,
11
HHS
encouraged the pharmaceutical industry to heed the meaningful
advice provided by OIG advisory opinions regarding the Anti-
Kickback Statute.
12
Due to the OIG rescinding guidance regarding
permissible PAPs, pharmaceutical funding for PAPs has been
reduced.
13
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has started to crack
down on the endeavors’ of PAPs.
InDecember 2017, drugmakerUnited Therapeutics agreed
to a $210 million settlement with the DOJ to resolve claims that it
violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by using an independent
charity organization to funnel support to its Medicare patients
healthcare/375810-no-matter-what-you-call-it-government-run-health-care-will-never-
work [https://perma.cc/EH4K-DGZK].
6
NORC & West Health Inst., supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
Marie A. Chisholm & Joseph T. DiPiro, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Assistance
Programs, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNALMED. 780, 780–81 (2002).
9
Pharmaceutical Assistance Program, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.
gov/pharmaceutical-assistance-program/ [https://perma.cc/5M96-F7U4].
10
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Advisory Op.
No. 06-03 (Apr. 18, 2006).
11
DaraCorrigan et al.,HHSOIGAdvisoryOpinionApprovesTwoPatientAssistance
Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP (Apr. 2006), https://files.
arnoldporter.com/arnold&porteradvisory-hhsoigadvisoryopinionapprovestwopatientassistance
programsformedicarepartdenrollees(0406).pdf [https://perma.cc/LX6N-3XDQ].
12
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Advisory Op.
No. 02-1, https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/index.asp [https://perma.cc/
XHS3-JBUB].
13
Michelle Huntsman, Kicking Costs Back to Patients: How Regulatory Scrutiny
of Patient Assistance Programs Will Affect Patients’ Wallets, J. HEALTHCARECOMPLIANCE,
July–Aug. 2018, at 27, 27.
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taking a number of pulmonary arterial hypertension drugs.
14
Similarly, in May 2018, Jazz Pharmaceuticals PLC, the maker of
the narcolepsy drug Xyrem, disclosed in its securities filing that it
reached a $57 million settlement agreement with the DOJ
regarding a charities-donation investigation.
15
A few weeks later,
drug manufacturer Pfizer, Inc. agreed to pay $23.85 million to
settle claims that it indirectly covered copays of its Medicare
patients taking cancer medications, such as Sutent and Inlyta.
16
As the health care industry rapidly evolves, so does the
difficulty in interpreting and applying federal legislation, such as
the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the FCA. The federal AKS
penalizes any individual or entity for receiving remuneration for
referring an individual in obtaining any item or service for which
a federal health care program provides funds.
17
Although the AKS
was originally enacted to combat unethical health care fraud, the
OIG has increased scrutiny through its advisory opinions to
encompass superficially harmless activities, such as the practice
of pharmaceutical companies donating to independent PAPs.
18
The FCA creates civil liability for fraudulent submissions seeking
reimbursements from the government.
19
The scope of this act has
also extended to health care fraud, as it punishes those that
submit fraudulent claims seeking reimbursement from Medicare
or Medicaid.
20
Each of these pieces of legislation go hand-in-
hand—as theorized in a qui tam suit brought against a specialty
pharmacy.
21
The court in Greenfield drew a link between the FCA
14
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Maker United
Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Liability for Paying
Kickbacks (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-united-therapeutics-agr
ees-pay-210-million-resolve-false-claims-act-liability [https://perma.cc/7JF8-WVRN].
15
Robert Langreth & Ben Elgin, Jazz Pharmaceuticals Sets Aside $57 Million
to Settle DOJ Probe, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-05-08/jazz-pharmaceuticals-sets-aside-57-million-to-settle-doj-probe
[https://perma.cc/W373-DQU5].
16
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Maker Pfizer
Agrees to Pay $23.85 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Liability for Paying Kickbacks
(May 24, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-pfizer-agrees-pay-2385-million
-resolve-false-claims-act-liability-paying-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/EJK5-6EKD].
17
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
18
See Richard P. Church et al., Increased Scrutiny of Patient Assistance
Programs: Enforcement Overview and Considerations, K&L GATES (Mar. 20, 2018),
http://www.klgates.com/increased-scrutiny-of-patient-assistance-programs-enforcement
-overview-and-considerations-03-20-2018/ [https://perma.cc/ZPM8-85GS].
19
31 U.S.C. § 3729.
20
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billi
on-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/P87Z-QP4L].
21
SeeUnited States ex rel.Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 100
(3d Cir. 2018) (holding that temporal proximity between a kickback and a submission for
claims reimbursement is insufficient to satisfy the elements of a False Claims Act violation).
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and the AKS on the basis that “[b]ecause any kickback violation
is not eligible for reimbursement, to certify otherwise violates the
False Claims Act.”
22
The Greenfield court looked to legislative
history of the statutes and reasoned that “Congress intended both
statutes to reach a broad swath of ‘fraud and abuse’ in the federal
healthcare system.”
23
The recent settlements illustrate efforts by
the government to curb violations of the AKS and FCA by
pharmaceutical donors and independent PAPs.
Congress has acknowledged the dangerously excessive
costs of health care. By discouraging pharmaceutical donors from
absorbing costs through PAPs, however, government prosecution
of AKS violations raise an alarming public concern: lack of access
to affordable health care. Currently, the DOJ and OIG investigate
kickback violations by examining whether pharmaceutical
donations to PAPs induce patients to purchase certain products,
resulting in governmental subsidizations of such products.
24
Such
inducement ties in with the remunerative aspects of PAPs which
the OIG has addressed: (i) indirect remunerations such as donor
contributions; and (ii) direct remunerations such as financial
assistance.
25
Further, the OIG analyzes whether “a donation is
made to a PAP to induce the PAP to recommend or arrange for
the purchase of the donor’s federally reimbursable items” and if
direct financial assistance is made “to influence the patient to
purchase . . . certain items.”
26
Due to the benefits that PAPs
provide patients, a direct causal link test ought to be adopted both
for the DOJ and the OIG in deciding whether or not to bring an
enforcement action against a pharmaceutical company and also
for the federal court system as courts interpret these statutes. By
investigating why beneficiaries chose a specific PAP, a court can
accurately identify whether or not the intent requirement is
satisfied to find an AKS violation. The foundation of this
argument rests on policy interests regarding the negative effects
of restricting PAPs. This note will analyze the costs of the U.S.
health care system in order to demonstrate the need for PAPs as
a way to significantly reduce patient health care costs.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 96.
24
Brett Friedman et al., Emerging Enforcement Trends for Patient Support
Programs, ROPES & GRAY LLP (May 16, 2018), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/news
room/alerts/2018/05/Emerging-Enforcement-Trends-For-Patient-Support-Programs
[https://perma.cc/9PBP-79TW].
25
Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Supplemental
Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs, 79 Fed. Reg.
31,120, 31,121 (May 30, 2014).
26
Id.
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Part I of this note will provide background on the rising
costs of health care in the United States to support the importance
of providing leewaywhen assessingwhether or not pharmaceutical
companies have violated the AKS. Part II will examine the current
state of federal health care legislation. Part III will address the
mechanisms of PAPs and their interactions with pharmaceutical
donors. Lastly, Part IV will propose a potential solution. When
determining whether or not the AKS has been violated, courts
must apply a direct causal link test: but-for the pharmaceutical
company’s donation, the patient would not have selected the
specific provider.
I. THE RISING COSTS OFHEALTH CARE
The United States spent more than $3.3 trillion, or nearly
a fifth of its gross domestic product (GDP), on health expenditures
in 2016.
27
By comparison, the United States spent just five
percent of its GDP on health care in 1960.
28
The United States
spends an exorbitant amount of money on health care that is
disproportional to the size of its wealth, compared to other
wealthy nations, such as Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom.
29
Other affluent nations only spend about half as much
per person on health care in comparison.
30
While the United
States spent approximately $10,244 per person in 2017, the
comparable country average was at $5,280.
31
Part I discusses the
many factors that have contributed to the rise in health care costs
such as market consolidation, drug costs, and the effect of the
rising uninsured rate.
A. Market Consolidation
Prices—rather than the quantity of care—have driven
the increase in U.S. spending.
32
One factor contributing to this
27
See NORC & West Health Inst., supra note 1.
28
Kimberly Amadeo, The Rising Cost of Health Care by Year and Its Causes: See for
Yourself If Obamacare Increased Health Care Costs, BALANCE (June 25, 2010), https://www.
thebalance.com/causes-of-rising-healthcare-costs-4064878 [https://perma.cc/27VS-QFNT].
29
Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S.
Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-count
ries/#item-start [https://perma.cc/EE9M-FLYK].
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Joseph Walker, Why Americans Spend So Much on Health Care—In 12
Charts, WALL STREET J. (July 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-americans-
spend-so-much-on-health-carein-12-charts-1533047243 [https://perma.cc/Z9MF-KGSR].
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increase in price is hospital consolidation,
33
which increases
hospitals’ market power.
34
Although a solution would be to
scrutinize large hospital systems for potentially violating
antitrust laws, health care professionals are concerned this would
lead to hospital closures,
35
only aggravating the current health
care crisis—necessitating a far less restrictive solution. Hospitals
that monopolize in any given geographic area tend to charge more
for procedures as opposed to areas with “four or more competing
hospitals.”
36
Although “[h]ighly concentrated markets . . . are
associated with higher health care prices . . . , [they] are not
typically associated with higher quality of care.”
37
The legal
system should reframe focus on reducing its scrutiny on
pharmaceutical donations because concentration levels between
providers and insurers vary across the United States due to the
large role given to states in regulating health care provider and
insurer markets.
38
Although insurers have higher bargaining
power to reduce prices in highly concentrated provider-insurer
markets, rarely do consumers benefit.
39
Insurers apply this power
by utilizing pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which are
companies that negotiate directly with pharmaceutical companies
on behalf of insurance companies.
40
Just as negotiating power is
shifted away from pharmaceutical companies, so should the
scrutiny concerning their donations to PAPs.
B. Drug Prices
The increase in prescription drug prices is a second factor
of the upsurge in U.S. health care spending.
41
In 2014, total
33
Id.
34
Brent D. Fulton et al., Market Concentration and Variation of Health Care
Providers andHealth Insurers in the United States, COMMONWEALTHFUND (July 30, 2018),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/variation-healthcare-provider-and-health-
insurer-market-concentration?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/DX4R-SLZR].
35
Luanne Rife, FTC Seeks to Determine if Hospital Monopolies Help or Harm
Patients, ROANOKE TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/
fellowships/projects/ftc-seeks-determine-if-hospital-monopolies-help-or-harm-patients
[https://perma.cc/99SD-FKKB].
36
Walker, supra note 32.
37
Fulton et al., supra note 34.
38
See id.
39
Id.
40
Joel T. Dodge, Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug
Spending, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/explainer/2019/apr/pharmacy-benefit-managers-and-their-role-drug-spend
ing [https://perma.cc/AV34-QQG5].
41
SeeOFFICEOFTHEASSISTANTSEC’YFORPLANNINGANDEVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: INNOVATION,
SPENDING,ANDPATIENTACCESS4 (2016).
2020] PHARMACEUTICAL PHILANTHROPY 577
spending on prescription drugs was approximately $424 billion.
42
Combined with the rise in drug prices, the funding required for the
research and development of these drugs has also risen.
43
The “cost
of bringing a new drug to market is very high,” while the cost of
replicating existing products is low.
44
Research and development is
driven by the rewards of pharmaceutical innovation such as
market exclusivity and patent protection, which is made possible
through stringent federal regulations.
45
By patenting new drugs,
pharmaceutical companies are protected against competition,
giving these companies the power to substantially dictate pricing.
46
Generally, pharmaceutical companies hold the exclusive patent
rights for fourteen years.
47
When the patent expires, other
companies are permitted to produce generic versions of the drug,
which can be up to ninety-five percent cheaper than the original.
48
Opponents of these intellectual property rights contend that
pharmaceutical companies exploit exclusivity regulations through
tactics such as “evergreening” and “hard switching.”
49
Evergreening—when a company patents a slightly different version
of an existing drug—is a renewal process used to keep generic
companies out of the market for a longer period of time.
50
This
method extends patents for modifications in dosage, molecular
structure, delivery mechanism, packaging, and much more.
51
Companies are permitted to market the newly patented alternative
42
Id.
43
See Matthew Herper, The Cost of Developing Drugs Is Insane. That Paper That
Says Otherwise Is Insanely Bad, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/matthewherper/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-a-paper-that-argued-
otherwise-was-insanely-bad/#79e51dee2d45 [https://perma.cc/FG86-8GWY].
44
Richard G. Frank & Paul B. Ginsburg, Pharmaceutical Industry Profits and
Research and Development, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.healthaff
airs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171113.880918/full/ [https://perma.cc/QGW2-JUUV].
45
See id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity,
FDA.GOV, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-
asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity [https://perma.cc/P7QT-D8H8] (explaining the
distinction between exclusivity and patents).
46
Hazel Moir & Deborah Gleeson, Explainer: Evergreening and How Big
Pharma Keeps Drug Prices High, CONVERSATION (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:27 PM EST), http://the
conversation.com/explainer-evergreening-and-how-big-pharma-keeps-drug-prices-high-
33623 [https://perma.cc/EN63-XDDU].
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Dennis Thompson, What’s Behind the Sharp Rise in Prescription Drug
Prices?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016, 11:17 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-
behind-the-sharp-rise-in-prescription-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/MQJ5-8HQ3].
50
Moir & Gleeson, supra note 46.
51
See generally Arun Kumar & Arun Nanda, Ever-greening in Pharmaceuticals:
Strategies, Consequences andProvisions for Prevention inUSA, EU, India andOther Countries,
PHARMACEUTICALREG. AFF.: OPENACCESS (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.omicsonline.org/open-
access/evergreening-in-pharmaceuticals-strategies-consequences-and-provisions-for-prevent
ion-in-usa-eu-india-and-other-countries-2167-7689-1000185.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE32-73GK]
(surveying themanymethods pharmaceutical companies employ to accomplish evergreening).
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under a different name (known as “brand migration”), as evidenced
by AstraZeneca marketing Nexium as the more effective version of
Prilosec—a profitable treatment for heartburn with an expiring
patent.
52
Hard switching occurs when “manufacturers stop selling
an older drug [that is] about to go generic and replace it with a new
high-price market-exclusive product.”
53
By removing a previous
version of a brand drug, physicians and patients are significantly
limited in their choice of prescription.
54
While most consumers could refuse to pay for these
drugs, Medicare beneficiaries cannot do so.
55
This is because
federal law prevents the Center for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) from negotiating with drug manufacturers.
56
Essentially, refusing to pay manufacturers’ prices is not an
option. PBMs are believed to be better able to negotiate drug
prices than the government.
57
PBMs are effective negotiators
due to the fact that they use volume-buying to negotiate
discounts.
58
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which
included a restriction on direct government involvement in Part
D price negotiations, resulted in PBMs playing an active role in
Part D plan negotiations.
59
C. Rates of Uninsured
Another factor contributing to the rise in health care
costs is the number of uninsured individuals.
60
According to a
Gallup report, over thirteen percent of U.S. adults were
uninsured in 2018—the highest level since the implementation
of the Affordable Care Act and the repeal of its individual
52
Id.
53
Thompson, supra note 49.
54
Chelsea E. Ott, Comment, The Evolution of Pharmaceutical Regulatory Gaming
Practices, 47 SETONHALLL. REV. 849, 862 (2017).
55
Thompson, supra note 49.
56
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i)(1)–(2). But see Medicare Prescription Drug Price
Negotiation Act of 2017, S. 41, 115th Cong. (2017) (seeking to amend Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act to require CMS to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies regarding
prices for drugs covered under the Medicare prescription drug benefit).
57
John Wasik, Why Medicare Can’t Get the Lowest Prices, FORBES (Aug. 10,
2018, 8:26AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2018/08/10/why-medicare-cant-
get-the-lowest-drug-prices/#3e3b5bae302b [https://perma.cc/HB4K-QAP6].
58
See ColeWerble, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, HEALTHAFF. (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000178/full/
[https://perma.cc/4CHZ-HT8F].
59
Id.
60
See David Mills, Why You Should Care if Your Neighbor Doesn’t Have Health
Insurance, HEALTHLINE (May 14, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/why-you-
should-care-if-your-neighbor-doesnt-have-health-insurance#1 [https://perma.cc/DQK9-6BS3].
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mandate.
61
The individual mandate, effected through a large
overhaul of the U.S. tax code, required most Americans to
purchase health insurance or else pay a fine.
62
But the number
of uninsured individuals increases if there is no penalty for
failure to have health insurance.
63
By weakening the law, the
cost of health insurance premiums subsequently rises when
there are fewer insured individuals.
64
Reliance on PAPs does not have the potential to further
exacerbate the underinsurance rate because PAP beneficiaries
are those who are currently underinsured. In the event the
number of PAP applicants does rise, PAPs would likely respond
by tightening the eligibility criteria, similar to how other social
safety nets operate when a culture of dependency is looming.
65
With this dangerous rise in health care costs, efforts to
improve both affordability and access to health care services are
essential. Rather than targeting the intent of pharmaceutical
donors when investigating AKS and FCA violations, the courts
should apply a direct causal link test—ultimately encompassing
the patients’ reasons for selecting a PAP. If the intent requirements
of the statute are not satisfied,
66
the result would be low-income
individuals being able to afford the prescription drugs they need.
II. CURRENT FEDERALHEALTH CARE LEGISLATION
While Congress enacted current health care legislation,
the executive branch, especially HHS, is in the best position to
apply “all of the evidence, data, and reasoning necessary for the
formulation of sound health policies”
67
in order to protect public
well-being. HHS spearheads initiatives to improve public health
61
Dan Witters, U.S. Uninsured Rates Rises to Four-Year High, GALLUP (Jan.
23, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/246134/uninsured-rate-rises-four-year-high.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JP6L-V4YG].
62
Yasmeen Abutaleb, U.S. Healthcare Spending to Climb 5.3 Percent in 2018:
Agency, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-health
care-spending/u-s-healthcare-spending-to-climb-5-3-percent-in-2018-agency-idUSKCN1FY2
ZD [https://perma.cc/YM2R-6DG5].
63
See SyMukherjee,TheGOPTax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s IndividualMandate.
Here’sWhat ThatMeans for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-
bill-individual-mandate-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/46NN-NR98].
64
Abutaleb, supra note 62.
65
Rema Hanna, New Research Busts the Myth of Welfare Dependency, WORLD
ECON. F. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/golden-truth-behind-wel
fare-dependency [https://perma.cc/Y2Z5-KRHL].
66
See infra II.A–B.
67
Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by the Three Branches
of Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
BIOMEDICINE 335, 351 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/books/NBK231979/ [https://perma.cc/BW8T-3HJH].
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and furthers medical research.
68
Although HHS developed
programs such as Medicaid and Medicare to benefit American
citizens, rising health care fraud has resulted in detrimental
effects to these individuals. The government sought to combat
this fraud through legislation such as the AKS and the FCA.
69
However, as Congress broadened the reach of these laws, entities
such as PAPs have come under increasing scrutiny
70
which has
led to detrimental impacts on the public health crisis.
A. The Anti-Kickback Statute
1. History and Development
The AKS is “an anti-corruption statute designed to protect
federal health care program beneficiaries from the influence of
money on referral decisions.”
71
The federal AKS penalizes any
individual or entity that:
knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration . . . directly or indirectly, . . . in return for referring an
individual to a person for the furnishing . . . of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal
health care program . . . .
72
The AKS reaches a broad range of business relationships,
specifically in the “pharmaceutical and medical device sectors.”
73
This criminal statute “prohibits transactions intended to induce
or reward referrals for items or services reimbursed by the
federal health care programs” (i.e., drugs, supplies, or health
care services for Medicare orMedicaid patients).
74
Remuneration
encompasses “anything of value,” including “free rent, expensive
hotel stays and meals, and excessive compensation for medical
directorships or consultancies.”
75
Violating the AKS results in
fines, jail terms, and exclusion from participation in federal
health care programs.
76
Ultimately, through the AKS, Congress
aimed to prevent overutilization of health care services,
68
See id.
69
Thomas S. Crane et al., What Is the Anti-Kickback Statute, A.B.A. (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/health-
law/what-is-anti-kickback-statute/ [https://perma.cc/HD56-RVXL].
70
See infra Part III.
71
Crane et al., supra note 69.
72
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
73
Crane et al., supra note 69.
74
Id.
75
A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, OFF. INSPECTOR
GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp [https://perma.cc/
VG2G-F38A] [hereinafter A Roadmap for New Physicians].
76
Id.
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corruption of medical decision-making, increased program costs,
patient steering, unfair competition, and poor-quality services.
77
The reasoning behind this legislation is that providers, who refer
other health care professionals, can easily be targeted by
kickback schemes.
78
When Congress initially passed the AKS in 1972, the act
had no scienter requirement, lacked exclusionary guidelines,
and did not categorize the violation as a felony.
79
The act was
intended to curb unethical referral activities that “led to the
inappropriate use of scarce federal funds”
80
dedicated to the
recently created Medicare and Medicaid programs.
81
However,
the act’s limited punitive power reduced its viability as an
enforcement tool.
82
In 1977, Congress broadened the act not only
to include “bribes” or “kickbacks,” but also “to prohibit the
payment of ‘remuneration’ . . . for referral.”
83
Congress also
“upgraded the … violation from a misdemeanor to a felony.”
84
This expanded the possible range of conduct, enabling the AKS
to combat fraud more effectively.
85
According to committee reports on the Medicare and
Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, there were three
purposes for amending the AKS.
86
First, Congress wanted to
upgrade the penalty to a felony because the previous legislation
failed to demonstrate effective deterrence.
87
The misdemeanor
penalty was also inconsistent with federal criminal sanctions that
punished similar behavior with felony penalties.
88
Second, the
amendments were intended to “clarify ambiguous language.”
89
The
word “remuneration” would be defined to include direct or indirect
“kickbacks, bribes, or rebates.”
90
Third, the amendments sought to
define certain business practices as outside the statute’s scope (e.g.,
77
See A Roadmap for New Physicians, supra note 75; Crane et al., supra note 69.
78
A Roadmap for New Physicians, supra note 75.
79
Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government’s Mistaken Use of
the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALSHEALTH
L. 105, 109 (1997).
80
Id. at 110.
81
Marc Stephen Raspanti & Douglas E. Roberts, A Practitioner’s Primer on
History and Use of the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, PIETRAGALLO (Mar. 28, 2017),
http://www.pietragallo.com/keep-informed.php?action=view&id=402#.XBu5WS-ZO8U
[https://perma.cc/W3P8-AJLY].
82
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Salcido, supra note 79, at 111.
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See Raspanti & Roberts, supra note 81.
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Salcido, supra note 79, at 111.
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Id. at 111–12.
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Id. at 112.
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Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, pt. 2, at 53 (1977), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3056).
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price discounts, so long as these reductions are “properly disclosed
and reflected in the . . . reimbursement . . . claimed”).
91
In the 1980
amendment, Congress added the “knowingly and willfully” mens
rea element,
92
resulting in interpretative differences which are the
focus of this note.
93
2. Current Interpretations of the Statute
Currently, the government is not required to show harm
to the patient nor financial loss to the program to prove an AKS
violation.
94
But the parties’ intent is the key element of their
liability.
95
Circuit courts are divided on what constitutes the
“knowing and willful” behavior necessary to violate the AKS.
96
In
fact, the Ninth Circuit in Hanlester Network v. Shalala held that
an AKS violation requires a “knowing and willful” mens rea that
the prohibited financial arrangement violates the Anti-Kickback
Statute.
97
The Eighth Circuit, however, has ruled that the “mens
rea standard should only require proof that [the defendant] knew
that [their] conduct was wrongful,” rather than proof that the
defendant “knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’”
98
Other courts,
such as the Third Circuit, have adopted a broader view: if “one
purpose” of the remuneration was to induce or reward referrals,
it constitutes a violation of the AKS.
99
However, this broader view
essentially results in the DOJ gaining unlimited discretion in
alleging AKS violations against otherwise legitimate business
arrangements.
100
Critics find it hard to believe that Congress
intended such broad interpretation.
101
As a result of these conflicting interpretations, Congress
has directed the OIG to develop thirty regulatory “Safe
Harbors,” each describing business arrangements that do not
violate the AKS.
102
The OIG believes the inclusion of numerous
standards in each safe harbor guarantees protection against the
91
Id. (quoting 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3056).
92
Id.
93
See infra Section II.A.2.
94
A Roadmap for New Physicians, supra note 75.
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Donn H. Herring, Fundamentals of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute,
2016 AHLA Seminar Papers 6 (Nov. 13, 2016).
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Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
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United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted).
99
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
remuneration violated the Anti-Kickback Statute if “one purpose . . . was to induce
future referrals”).
100
See Herring, supra note 96.
101
See id.
102
Id.
2020] PHARMACEUTICAL PHILANTHROPY 583
AKS for certain business arrangements.
103
Failure for a business
practice to fit into a safe harbor does not equate to an automatic
violation of the AKS, rather it welcomes further scrutiny by the
DOJ in its investigation.
104
Moreover, AKS violations can result
in civil penalties up to three times each kickback and fines of
$15,000 per violation as well as criminal penalties.
105
Although
Congress might have intended the AKS to prevent increased
costs resulting from increased utilization of health care services,
the statute itself hinders overall cost reduction attempts made
by pharmaceutical companies.
106
B. The False Claims Act
1. What is the False Claims Act?
The AKS also opens the door for violations of the FCA.
107
The FCA protects the government against overcharging by
pharmaceutical companies as well as falling victim to fraudulent
sales of either goods or services.
108
The FCA can be differentiated
between criminal and civil liabilities, as the former is brought by
local, state, or federal prosecutors, whereas the latter is brought
to court by the victim of the defrauding.
109
Additionally, criminal
liability requires specific intent of the wrongdoing while civil
liability foregoes such requirement.
110
Under the FCA, individuals
or entities that submit false or fraudulent claims to Medicare or
Medicaid seeking reimbursement are subject to civil liabilities.
111
To prove that a Medicare or Medicaid claim is false, the
government must show that the procedure or provision of
equipment either: (1) did not occur,
112
(2) did not occur as stated,
113
103
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104
Id.
105
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See infra Part III.
107
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
108
A Roadmap for New Physicians, supra note 75.
109
Criminal Fraud VS Civil Fraud: What’s the Difference, BOCHETTO&LENTZPC
(Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.bochettoandlentz.com/criminal-fraud-vs-civil-fraud-whats-
difference/ [https://perma.cc/KQ5G-4QHD].
110
Norman E. Greenspan, Best Practices: Civil Versus Criminal Liability for
False Claims (Nov. 9, 2016), https://starfieldsmith.com/2016/11/best-practices-civil-ver
sus-criminal-liability-for-false-claims/ [https://perma.cc/FWF4-KX94].
111
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)
112
United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding an “inference of
willfulness . . . obvious” where the treatments billed toMedicare had never been performed).
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United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 498 (6th
Cir. 2007) (finding inflated cost reports in Medicare and Medicaid claims to be, inter alia,
willful conduct).
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or (3) was not medically necessary.
114
Although the FCA
“require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud,” “the terms
‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’” specify “a person, with respect to
information” who “(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii)
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information.”
115
Recovery under the FCA can result
in penalties of up to $11,000 per claim, as well as treble damages
and the possibility of individual liability and criminal sanctions.
116
2. Current Interpretations of the Act
Similar to the AKS, the FCA has been subject to
interpretative differences regarding its intent requirement—yet
another reason why courts ought to tighten the intent
requirement. The Senate Judiciary Committee advised that,
although individuals have an obligation to ensure accuracy when
conducting business with the government, minor mistakes or
inaccurate claims should not be punished.
117
Congress has further
stated that the reckless disregard intent requirement is
essentially comparable to gross negligence,
118
and that reckless
disregard “does not require any proof of an intentional, deliberate,
or willful act.”
119
Consistent with the legislation, courts have
found for the government and have held health care professionals
liable for violating the FCA, even if the defendants did not act
with the specific intent to defraud the government.
120
114
United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376–77
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding that allegations of unnecessary hospital admissions and upgrading
of patient organ transplant status were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
115
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
116
John W. Nisbett, The Three-Headed Monster of Healthcare Fraud
Enforcement: The False Claims Act, Stark Law, and the Anti-Kickback Statute, A.B.A.
(Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/top
ics/health-law/three-headed-monster-healthcare-fraud-enforcement-false-claims-act-
stark-law-anti-kickback-statute/ [https://perma.cc/Q8NM-PMUP].
117
Salcido, supra note at 79, at 120 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5261–72).
118
See 132 CONG. REC. 20,429, 20,535–36 (1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
119
Id.
120
See United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941–42 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that the defendant violated the FCA by acting in reckless disregard when he knowingly
submitted improper claims); see also United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1132
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding the defendant liable under the FCA for acting in reckless disregard
of the truth of falsity of the information when he submittedMedicare claims for oral cancer
examinations, knowing they were improperly coded).
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C. Overlap of the Anti-Kickback Statute and False Claims
Act
Courts are split on whether a FCA action predicated on an
Anti-Kickback Statute violation may be tried.
121
This tactic would
result in plaintiffs possibly collecting damages in multiples.
122
The
Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health
Solutions, Inc. held that “there must be some connection between
a kickback and a subsequent reimbursement claim.”
123
In
Greenfield, the former vice president of AccredoHealthGroup, Inc.,
a specialty pharmacy for patients with hemophilia, alleged its
reimbursement claims violated the FCA because the company
“made donations to charities, two of which allegedly recommended
Accredo as an approved provider for hemophilia patients.”
124
The
plaintiff argued that because the pharmacy violated the AKS by
paying kickbacks to the charities designed as donations, these
Medicare claims submitted for reimbursement were falsely
certified—constituting a FCA violation.
125
Largely due to the fact
the relator brought this action using circumstantial evidence, the
court concluded that in order to prevail under this theory, the
relator “must provide ‘evidence of the actual submission of a false
claim’” that was made in violation of the AKS.
126
The court also
noted that “Congress intended both statutes to reach a broad swath
of ‘fraud and abuse’ in the federal healthcare system.”
127
Similarly, a federal district court in Tennessee analyzed
whether one may actually bring a FCA violation simultaneous to
an AKS violation in United States ex rel. Pogue v. American
Healthcorp, Inc.
128
In Pogue, the plaintiff alleged that because the
defendants were involved in a scheme where physicians would
refer their Medicare and Medicaid patients to a health care
facility for treatment, in violation of the AKS, claim submissions
for reimbursement violated the FCA, as these claims were
fraudulent.
129
The court concluded that the FCA was not only
intended to police fraudulent acts that defraud the government
on their face, but also to apply to fraudulent acts that cause the
121
Salcido, supra note at 79, at 107.
122
See supra Section II.B.
123
United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 100
(3d Cir. 2018).
124
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127
Id. at 96 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-393, at 47 (1977)).
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See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507,
1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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government to reimburse “claimants it did not intend to
benefit.”
130
A FCA action not only covers false claims, but also
claims where a defendant is engaged in a fraudulent arrangement
resulting in reimbursement from the government.
131
The court
found there was a valid cause of action under the FCA because
the “Defendants concealed their illegal activities from the
government in an effort to defraud the government into paying
Medicare claims it would not have otherwise paid.”
132
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. adopted a different approach.
133
In Columbia/HCA, plaintiff
brought an action against defendants for violating the FCA,
alleging that defendants’ “investment arrangements . . . provided
financial inducements . . . for patient referrals.”
134
The defendants
contended that even if the AKSwas violated, there was no violation
of the FCA because the cost reports (i.e., actual claims) themselves
were not false, meaning they were medically necessary.
135
The
court found for the defendants, concluding that the claim itself
must be false or fraudulent in order to find liability under the
FCA.
136
While the district court’s holding was partially vacated, the
Fifth Circuit did, however, hold that claims of fraud cannot be
based on “speculation and conclusory allegations.”
137
The government contends that courts should permit such
combined actions because, without combining the two, it would
“dilute the Anti-Kickback Statute’s ‘knowing and willful’ standard
into the False ClaimsAct’s ‘knowing’ standard.”
138
This is attractive
for the government because it would essentially make it easier to
find liability and to collect triple in damages, as permitted by the
act. Nonetheless, an overly broad interpretation of the AKS will
detrimentally affect the catalysts of change, such as PAPs, that
benefit the health care industry.
139
Due to the differing views and
lack of a definitive resolution, courts should clearly identify the
reasoning behind patients’ PAP selection as a means of satisfying
or failing to satisfy the legislative scienter requirements.
130
Id. at 1513.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., CHC
Holdings, 938 F. Supp. 399, 406–07 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding the claim itself must be
fraudulent), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997).
134
Id. at 401.
135
Id. at 406.
136
Id. at 406–07.
137
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., CHC
Holdings, 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997).
138
Salcido, supra note 79, at 108.
139
See id.
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While the government sources its discretionary power
from the dual use of the statutes to combat health care fraud, it
inadvertently curbs the beneficial practices employed by
pharmaceutical companies—such as the use of PAPs—to reduce
patient costs. It is thus imperative to not only analyze the policy
ramifications of this enforcement strategy but also consider the
legal test that courts apply to these violations. Since the
government is using the FCA to bypass the intent requirements
of the AKS, courts must apply a stricter legal test to determine
whether companies violated the AKS.
III. PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
The future of PAPs are under threat due to the
government’s prosecution of such programs under both the AKS
and the FCA; however, the current interpretation of these two
statutes must be reconsidered in light of the fact that these
programs significantly improve patient access to affordable
health care. By scrutinizing donations received by PAPs, the DOJ
and OIG severely limit patient access to critical funds to receive
prescription drugs and the government’s prosecution further
disincentivizes pharmaceutical companies from innovating new
solutions for patients in need.
A. What Are Patient Assistance Programs?
Patient assistance programs, also known as
pharmaceutical/prescription assistance programs, are offered by
pharmaceutical companies as a method of financial assistance
for consumers that need certain prescription drugs.
140
PAPs help
patients by subsidizing out-of-pocket costs.
141
Independent
charity organizations administer PAPs.
142
Other nonprofit
groups and state government programs also sometimes offer
assistance to cover the costs of these prescription drugs.
143
Patients seeking assistance can apply directly through the
pharmaceutical company.
144
Some examples of notable PAPs
140
NAT’L COUNCIL ON PATIENT INFO. & EDUC., UNDERSTANDING PRESCRIPTION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 1 (PAPS), https://www.bemedwise.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
12/paps.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT7K-XJDF].
141
So-Yeon Kang et al., Financial Eligibility Criteria and Medication Coverage for
IndependentCharityPatientAssistancePrograms, 322(5)NEWENG.J.MED.422–29 (Aug.6,2019).
142
See supra note 18.
143
Patient Assistance Programs for Prescription Drugs, WEBMD, https://www.
webmd.com/healthy-aging/patient-assistance-programs-for-prescription-drugs#1
[https://perma.cc/592C-E9Y2].
144
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include: the Bristol-Myers Squibb Patient Assistance Foundation,
145
PfizerRxPathways,
146
MerckPatientAssistance Program,
147
and the
GSK Patient Assistance Program.
148
PAPs typically collect both
patient financial information, with the requirements being
determined by the pharmaceutical company, and prescription
information from the respective physicians.
149
The pharmaceutical
company reviews the application and decides whether or not the
patient is eligible for assistance.
150
Examples of eligibility
requirements include: lack of insurance coverage for the necessary
prescription drug, current residence in either the United States or
one of the U.S. territories, current outpatient treatment by a U.S.
licensed prescriber, and a yearly income at or below three hundred
percent of the Federal Poverty Level.
151
Once approved, the patient
or the patient’s physician will receive a limited supply of the
prescription at either no cost or a reduced cost.
152
PAPs have also
covered co-payment obligations.
153
By doing so, PAPs provide
financial relief for patients who need fundamental
prescription drugs.
Some PAPs even include support systems that provide
advice to patients about various medications.
154
For example,
Pfizer Rx Pathways, a PAP associated directly with the
manufacturer Pfizer, not only offers financial assistance, but also
treatment-specific patient support hubs.
155
Specifically,
hemophiliac patients prescribed BeneFix or Xyntha have access
to “Pfizer Hemophilia Connect”—which has essentially created a
community for patients to connect together.
156
This community
provides educational information, counseling and support,
scholarship assistance, and much more.
157
145
Why BMSPAF, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, http://www.bmspaf.org/#home
[https://perma.cc/8BHE-T9ZQ].
146
Pfizer RxPathways, PFIZER, https://www.pfizer.com/purpose/patient-assista
nce-programs [https://perma.cc/XMJ6-4NRK].
147
The Merck Patient Assistance Program Helps Those in Need, MERCKHELPS,
https://www.merckhelps.com/ [https://perma.cc/V48P-MRXV].
148
GSK For You, GLAXOSMITHKLINE, https://www.gskforyou.com/uninsured-
patient-assistance/ [https://perma.cc/LTF2-3NL8].
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Id.
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Patient Assistance Programs for Prescription Drugs, supra note 143.
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Huntsman, supra note 13, at 27.
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See, e.g., Learn About Programs, PFIZER RXPATHWAYS, https://www.pfizer
rxpathways.com/learn-about-programs [https://perma.cc/R8H9-3JFV].
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See id.
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See Pfizer Hemophilia Connect, BENEFIX.COM, https://www.benefix.com/financi
al-support [https://perma.cc/M5CG-MHWW]; Resources and Support, XYNTHA.COM, https://
www.xyntha.com/resources#hemophilia-connect [https://perma.cc/R8LB-VMBJ].
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In April 2018, the Partnership for Prescription Assistance
(PPA) reported that it connected tenmillion individuals to various
PAPs.
158
The PPA is an entity that links patients to PAPs through
a call center and website.
159
At the time of PPA’s launch in 2005,
the U.S. Census Bureau reported that over forty-six million
individuals were uninsured.
160
Similarly, one study performed at
Nassau University Medical Center found that a cancer
medication PAP not only provided patients with treatment they
would have not otherwise been able to afford, but also increased
patient compliance with chemotherapy protocols.
161
The total cost
savings in 2012 from this program was over $1.7 million.
162
B. Patient Assistance Programs Violating the Anti-
Kickback Statute
In light of recent developments, however, pharmaceutical
companies have feared that their PAPs could violate the federal
AKS since the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006.
163
Medicare
Part D is a voluntary prescription drug benefit for Medicare
beneficiaries.
164
Enrollees can select to either supplement their
existing coverage, or can enroll in a more inclusive plan.
165
Medicare Part D was designed to protect beneficiaries against
“cost-related underuse of medications.”
166
Although CMS permits PAPs to provide assistance to
low-income individuals, such as Medicare Part D enrollees, CMS
is determined to ensure separateness between Part D benefits
158
Hannah Mooney, PPA Celebrates 13 Years of Helping Patients Access Their
Medicines, PHARMACEUTICAL RES. & MANUFACTURERS AM. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://
catalyst.phrma.org/ppa-celebrates-13-years-of-helping-patients-access-their-medicines
[https://perma.cc/RW28-4KLP].
159
Partnership for Prescription Assistance, AM. ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS, https://
www.aafp.org/about/initiatives/prescription-assistance.html [https://perma.cc/B7CE-3HYY].
160
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Assistance Programs via a Pharmacy Department Patient Assistance Program for
Indigent Cancer Patients, 51 HOSP. PHARMACY 572, 572 (July 5, 2016), https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4981105/ [https://perma.cc/5L9Z-7VQ2].
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Rachel S. Brown et al.,Medicare Coverage and Major Medicare-Related Coverage
Options for Elders and Persons with Disabilities, in ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR
INCAPACITATEDCLIENT INMASSACHUSETTS, at ch. 28, § 28.13.1 (4th ed. Supp. 2018).
164
An Overview of the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/an-overview-of-the-medi
care-part-d-prescription-drug-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/5APB-SNRZ].
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Yuting Zhang et al., The Effect of Medicare Part D on Drug and Medical
Spending, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 52–61 (July 2, 2009), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMsa0807998 [https://perma.cc/TA4F-FBD8].
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and PAP assistance.
167
It can be inferred that this is so the
government will not have to reimburse Medicare Part D claims
submitted for prescription drugs that were provided through
PAP assistance. In 2005, the OIG issued a Special Advisory
Bulletin stating that PAPs might be unlawful if pharmaceutical
companies arranged to pay for prescriptions during the coverage
gap known as the “donut hole”
168
only if the beneficiary agreed to
use the manufacturers’ drugs.
169
The “donut hole” is the coverage gap that surrounds
Medicare Part D.
170
It is “a temporary limit on what most
Medicare Part D . . . plans pay for prescription drug costs.”
171
During this gap, individuals end up paying higher costs for their
prescription drugs.
172
Reaching this coverage gap occurs when
the patient and the plan spend a combined $3,820 (as of 2019)
after reaching the deductible requirement and paying the plan’s
cost share for covered medications.
173
During the “donut hole,”
patients are likely to pay “[twenty-five percent] of the plan’s cost
for brand-name drugs and generic drugs.”
174
After the patient
reaches $5,100 in out-of-pocket spending on drug costs, the
patient moves past the coverage gap and into the catastrophic
coverage phase returning to reduced co-insurance and co-
payment amounts for covered prescriptions.
175
The government’s biggest concern regarding independent
PAPs is whether these services promote the pharmaceutical
companies’ medications.
176
Prosecutors are not only investigating
donations, but also the unlimited availability offered by health
care professionals when patients contact them with questions.
177
Government investigators want to know if the AKS and the FCA
167
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Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/PAPData.html
[https://perma.cc/F3PA-S5V9].
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are being violated when PAPs promote certain products that are
reimbursed by federal government health programs.
178
It is important to note that this practice of pharmaceutical
companies engaging in PAPs was not always scrutinized.
179
In
response to an advisory opinion request, the OIG advised that
donors can fund an independent PAP on the condition that these
donations comply with HHS.
180
The OIG’s 2005 special advisory
bulletin set out guidelines to help companies avoid violating the
AKS when contributing to independent PAPs.
181
Contributions
would not violate the AKS so long as the independent PAP retains
control, and: (1) drug company donors do not “exert[ ] any direct
or indirect influence or control over the . . . program;” (2) the
assistance is awarded “in a truly independent manner that severs
any link between the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s funding and
the beneficiary[;]”(3) the independent PAP provides assistance
without catering to the interests of the pharmaceutical donor or
deference to “the beneficiary’s choice of product, provider,
practitioner, supplier or Part D drug plan;” (4) the independent
PAP “provide[s] assistance based upon a reasonable, verifiable,
and uniform measure of financial need that is applied in a
consistent manner;” and (5) the pharmaceutical donor does “not
solicit or receive data from” the independent PAP that would
“facilitate the manufacturer in correlating the amount or
frequency of its donations with the number of subsidized
prescriptions for its products.”
182
In 2014, the OIG supplemented the 2005 special advisory
bulletin, further probing independent PAPs.
183
This guidance
advised that the disease funds should not appear to be narrowly
defined in a manner that favors any of the fund’s donors.
184
By
narrowly limiting independent PAPs to a specific disease,
financial assistance is limited to only expensive drugs, essentially
steering patients to only drugs that are available through the
financial assistance program: the pharmaceutical donor’s own
products.
185
In 2015, the DOJ began investigating the activities of
178
See id.
179
See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Advisory
Op. 97-01 (June 11, 1997).
180
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181
Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Special Advisory
Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg.
70,623, 70,626 (Nov. 22, 2005).
182
Id. at 70,626.
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Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Supplemental
Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs, 79 Fed. Reg.
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184
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pharmaceutical donors and independent PAPs in conjunction
with the concern over sharply rising drug prices.
186
Closer to the writing of this note, in January 2020, the OIG
issued a favorable advisory opinion in which it concluded a
pharmaceutical manufacturer could provide certain patients with
financial assistance for travel, lodging, and other expenses.
187
The
opinion stated that although the assistance could possibly violate
the AKS, the OIG will not impose sanctions on the cell therapy
drug manufacturer.
188
This is significant in that the OIG permitted
this arrangement because “only certain providers could offer the
necessary care” and because this “was not used amarketing tool.”
189
This beckons an inquiry into whether other PAPs can currently
meet this criteria within their programs.
On one hand, PAPs help patients who would otherwise not
be able to afford life-saving medication.
190
On the other hand, the
government argues that these services create individual patient
dependency on specific drugs over alternatives.
191
The continued
use of these drugs will drive health care costs by “pushing higher-
priced drugs on patients.”
192
Manufacturers might continue to
increase prices if patient demand becomes less susceptible to the
prices of brand-name drugs.
193
In fact, this raises a valid question:
“[d]o high prices makes [PAPs] necessary, or do [PAPs] lead to
higher drug prices?”
194
By receiving a deep discount on their medication, low-
income patients are attracted to drug-specific PAPs.
195
This leads
to an increase in demand, which ultimately can be used to
increase price and thus profits. While pharmaceutical companies
benefit from this, patients, who desperately need these
medications, are nonetheless able to procure these drugs at an
affordable price.
186
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Programs, LAW360 (May 15, 2018, 12:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1042623/eme
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From a purely practical, health-oriented perspective,
PAPs provide a tremendous amount of relief to Americans that
cannot otherwise afford necessary prescription drugs. They are
a safety net for both those without health insurance and for
those that have inadequate coverage.
196
One-third of Americans
and two-thirds of the elderly population report having difficulty
paying for prescription medications,
197
with more than twenty-
five percent of patients being unable to fill a prescription.
198
PAPs were designed to address this public health concern.
199
It
is estimated that, between 2005 and 2009, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) group have
helped 5.5 million Americans through its PPA program.
200
The
beneficial effects can be seen by programs like Biogen’s PAP for
multiple sclerosis, which has capped co-payments at less than
one percent of the drug’s total cost.
201
Another pharmaceutical
company, Dendreon, covers a significant portion of its patients’
out-of-pocket costs for its customers using its $93,000 prostate
therapy treatment.
202
While patients may duck these costs, the
remaining expenses are absorbed both by pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the health system.
203
The OIG is aware of the need for PAPs and is cognizant of
their benefits, especially for patients who require costly
prescriptions to treat chronic diseases.
204
But the government
maintains that pharmaceutical companies are “potentially
violat[ing] laws by providing free services to doctors and patients,”
205
partly because of the “two remunerative aspects of PAPs.”
206
One of
these remunerative aspects includes pharmaceutical donor
contributions to PAPs, which the government characterizes as
indirect remuneration.
207
Under this theory, a donation made to a
PAP is analyzed to see if its purpose was to dictate purchase of the
pharmaceutical donor’s drugs.
208
The second aspect posits that an
196
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AKS violation occurs where a PAP directly assists a patient in order
to induce them to buy a specific drug.
209
C. Government Scrutiny into PAPs
Among the most recent pharmaceutical companies
scrutinized by the government for allegedly inducing sales through
PAPs are Amgen Inc., Bayer AG, Eli Lilly & Co., Sanofi SA, and
Gilead Sciences Inc.
210
These investigations are drawing attention
to the services offered by drug companies similar to the notoriety
surrounding the once-common practice of enticing high-prescribing
physicians with special treatment.
211
Although pharmaceutical
companies argue that their assistance programs benefit patients,
prosecutors and critics contend that these services encourage
continued use of brand-name products over generic alternatives.
212
In one instance, the government has argued that Sanofi
violated the AKS by offering patients disease education about
diabetes.
213
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York requested documents and information regarding the
pharmaceutical company’s “certified diabetes educator program.”
214
Sanofi’s program consisted of health care professionals answering
patients’ questions about diabetes and showing them how to use its
diabetes treatments.
215
Moreover, AbbVie Inc. is presently engaged in a lawsuit
against California’s insurance commissioner, who has alleged
that physicians were induced into prescribing Humira, the
world’s highest-selling drug, because doctors saved time and
money by having AbbVie send registered nurses to visit and
educate patients on how to use the drug.
216
At the time of writing,
the action was remanded to the Superior Court of California for
the County of Alameda.
217
Proponents of these lawsuits argue that
although pharmaceutical services, such as educating patients and
defraying co-payment costs help patients, these services
“undermine[ ] medical decision making.”
218
Opponents of PAPs
have argued that these programs are also associated with hidden
costs created by shifting the cost from individual patients to
209
Id.
210
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211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
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215
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insurers and taxpayers.
219
In contrast, targeting low-income
patients or providing assistance for all medical costs (not just the
specific drug) would not be an ideal solution due to issues of
under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. This would not only
narrow the category of patients that drug companies could
provide assistance to, but also substantially raise costs for
pharmaceutical companies to take on the burden of paying for all
incurred medical costs, including the specific prescription drug.
Among these settlements, one PAP organization
challenged the government by alleging that HHS violated its free
speech rights.
220
In January 2018, Patient Services, Inc. (PSI),
brought a lawsuit against HHS, its Acting Secretary, and the
OIG, seeking an order to allow PSI to exercise its constitutionally
protected right to free speech in order to continue assisting the
nation’s most vulnerable patient population through its PAP.
221
The plaintiff claims that the advisory opinion
222
restricts PSI’s
ability to communicate critical information regarding disease-
specific drugs to the PAP’s beneficiaries.
223
Since the filing, the
OIG has responded through a motion for leave to take discovery,
requesting supporting evidence that the advisory opinion did
actually cost PSI millions of dollars in donations.
224
The advisory
opinion precluded PSI from asking donors and potential donors
for information “about a wide range of issues, including diseases,
drugs and patient populations.”
225
Although this case was
dismissed with prejudice January 2020,
226
the crux of this
complaint fails to address a solution regarding the possible AKS
violation.
227
Even if PSI is successful on the merits of the First
Amendment claim and the OIG is enjoined from prohibiting
certain communications between the PAP and its beneficiaries,
there still could be consequences if PSI does not comply with the
AKS. This is where courts should apply a direct causal link
analysis to limit intrusion into legitimate beneficial PAP
219
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220
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See generallyOffice of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health &Human Servs., Notice
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practices. By investigating why beneficiaries chose a specific PAP,
a court can accurately identify whether or not the mens rea is
satisfied to find an AKS violation.
IV. A SOLUTION: THEDIRECT CAUSAL LINK TEST
It is imperative for courts to modify how they address the
issue of PAPs potentially violating the AKS. Although Congress
designed the AKS with the intention of protecting federal health
care program beneficiaries from the financial influence of referral
decisions,
228
courts must weigh the patients’ interests that are
served by curing the defective intent requirements. With patients
drowning in health care costs, pharmaceutical donors often act as
lifeguards.
229
They are not necessarily intervening in order to
induce future sales; rather they are acting philanthropically,
usually to carry out goals, such as “deliver[ing] innovative
medicines that help patients prevail over serious diseases.”
230
Courts, not Congress, are the ideal candidates to implement this
solution as they are more readily able to determine, from the
evidence and facts, whether or not a patient had the intention to
participate in a specific PAP because of a manufacturer’s donation.
A. Two-Prong Analysis
Courts should: (1) apply a direct causal link test, which
would then (2) require shifting the intent inquiry from the health
care professional to the patient. The direct causal link test would
require courts to ask whether, but for the donation to the PAP,
the patient would not have chosen to participate in that specific
PAP. Under the first prong, the court would ascertain whether
the beneficiary chose a specific PAP because they knew that the
organization receives donations from a pharmaceutical
manufacturer. The inquiry under the second prong would seek to
determine whether the pharmaceutical donor knew the
beneficiary chose a specific PAP because of knowledge of the
organization receiving donations from a pharmaceutical
manufacturer, and then knowingly and willfully acted on this
information with the intent of inducing patients’ dependency on
the product, resulting in future sales. Narrowing down the
228
See supra Part II.
229
See GLOB. ALL. FOR PATIENT ACCESS, THE ROLE OF DRUG DONATIONS IN
EXPANDING ACCESS TO MEDICINES 2 (Aug. 2017), http://gafpa.org/wp-content/uploads/
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Our Mission and Our Commitment, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, https://www.
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specific actions and intentions of the beneficiary would ultimately
guide the court in determining whether or not the intent
requirement of the AKS is satisfied.
If the government fails to prove that, but for the
pharmaceutical donation to an independent PAP, the patient
would not have selected that charity organization to seek
financial assistance, no violation exists. This solution was chosen
because of its similarity to legal standards applied in products
liability cases—an area of law with which the pharmaceutical
industry is very well versed.
231
“Pharmaceutical liability relates to
the liability of a pharmaceutical manufacturer when its
pharmaceutical product is alleged to have injured a person”
232
Products can cause harm through manufacturing or design
defects, failure to warn, and many other theories.
233
Products
liability law exists to protect consumers, such as patients, from
the harms created by the manufacturer. In products liability
cases, plaintiffs have the burden to prove that “but for the
product’s defect, the plaintiff would not have suffered the injury,”
and that “the product defect is the ‘proximate cause’ of the
injury.”
234
Just as it is wrong for a manufacturer to harm the
patient, it is wrong for the government to harm the patient; and
just as patients have to prove they were harmed by a defective
drug, the government should bring out patient testimony to see if
there was an actual harm (i.e. Did they contribute to inducing
sales?). Although the government is trying to curb the potentially
unethical behavior of pharmaceutical companies, such action
ultimately affects patients’ access to life-changingmedications. In
light of that, patients should be afforded a fair opportunity to
participate in the government investigations. If they learn that
their access to specific drugs will be severed, patients have a
reason to come testify as to their intentions for choosing a specific
PAP. If the government has trouble finding willing participants,
it should consider subpoenaing patients. Patients would likely
participate as their failure to do so could lead to the termination
of their PAP benefits if a court finds sufficient proof for AKS or
FCA violations. Alternatively, PAPs could stipulate in their
agreement with patients that compliance with court subpoenas
are mandatory to receive continued assistance.
231
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SMITH CLIENT ALERTS (Dec. 3, 2001), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2001/12/
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B. Patient Participation
In order to address this one-sided investigation, prosecutors
should interview the beneficiaries participating in suspect PAPs.
The government can first narrow down geographically to where it
believes an increase in sales exists as a result of donor influence.
For example, if prosecutors believe “X Pharmaceuticals” is
generating more revenue in “State Z,” the investigation should
begin by contacting the PAP beneficiaries in “State Z,” assuming
there is evidence that the PAP received donations from “X
Pharmaceuticals.” Investigators would need to interview these
beneficiaries to identify why they selected a particular PAP.
Similar to a class action suit, the government would need to collect
a sample of beneficiaries that would be willing to testify as to why
they selected a specific PAP, and then move forward with a trial, if
prosecutors can obtain sufficient evidence to support a theory that
revenue increased due to the pharmaceutical donations.
Prosecutors must broaden the focus beyond just health care
professionals to also include the individual decisions made by
patients. By homing in on the direct actions of the patients,
specifically why they chose to participate in a distinct PAP, there
is an opportunity to revisit the intent requirement within the AKS.
C. Strengthening the Scienter Requirement
The direct causal link test would additionally address
problems with the scienter requirement. The AKS contains a
distinct scienter requirement.
235
Specifically, it requires the
violator to act in a “knowing[ ] and willful[ ] ” manner.
236
Prosecutors have been circumventing this intent requirement by
pursuing actions based on violations of the False Claims Act,
237
which has a looser knowledge requirement.
238
Applying the
direct causal link test will prevent prosecutors from using the
FCA as a vehicle to recover AKS violations. These lawsuits
allege AKS violations triggered violations of the FCA.
239
Under
this theory, the face of the submitted claim might not actually
235
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236
Id. (emphasis added).
237
See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507,
1508–09 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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to know the submitted claim was false).
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Robert N. Rabecs, Kickbacks as False Claims: The Use of the Civil False
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be false; instead, they are alleged to be fraud based on accepting
or paying of kickbacks.
240
D. Actual Causation
Finally, this “but-for” test addresses actual causation.
241
Addressing actual causation provides clarity as to whether the
AKS’s scienter requirement is satisfied. Clearly identifying the
reason a patient chose a specific PAP will prevent courts from
second-guessing pharmaceutical companies’ donative intent.
Specifically, the burden increases for prosecutors to show that
donors did, in fact, “knowingly and willfully” act to induce future
sales.
242
Under the “but-for” test, “an act . . . was a cause of an
injury if and only if, but for the act, the injury would not have
occurred.”
243
Here, courts would determine whether the
beneficiary chose a specific PAP because the beneficiary knew
the PAP was receiving contributions from a pharmaceutical
donor. Courts could look to see whether or not there is evidence
to support the fact that a pharmaceutical donor knew a
beneficiary selected a specific PAP because of the continuous
stream of funds coming into that organization, or because they
actually required those prescription drugs associated with that
specific PAP. Essentially the questions boil down to: (1) why did
the patient choose “PAP A” instead of “PAP B”; and (2) did the
patient choose “PAP A” because “PAP A” received donations
from “X Pharmaceuticals”?
To be sure, gathering information from every beneficiary
is a monumental task—but it is a critical one. Although the
government may argue that it is impractical, it should embrace
this burden. By identifying the beneficiaries’ intent, the
government would be able to demonstrate whether or not the
knowledge requirement within the AKS’s scienter has been met.
The benefit of identifying the reason why an individual chose a
specific PAP goes directly towards determining whether or not a
pharmaceutical company induced sales for self-gain. This benefit
outweighs the burden because it more accurately pinpoints
whether a PAP violated the AKS or whether there was another
reason for an increase in sales.
Although it may look like the pharmaceutical company is
being punished by the decisions made by either the court or the
DOJ, ultimately it is really patients who are the ones affected by
240
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241
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242
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243
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the final decision. If the government continues to scrutinize
pharmaceutical companies for contributing to PAPs, eventually
these companies will have no choice but to stop providing patient
assistance. If that happens, these patients will not be able to
obtain the prescription drugs they need to survive. For example,
the state of California passed AB265 in 2017, which prohibits
pharmaceutical companies from discounting individual out-of-
pocket costs if a lower cost generic equivalent is available.
244
The
effect of this law is the “propensity to raise the out of pocket cost
of prescriptions.”
245
The government probing into these charity
organizations can have far-reaching consequences to the patients,
even if prosecutors are only trying to ensure compliance from
pharmaceutical manufacturers.
246
While drug manufacturers will
still be able to sell their products, those sales will not necessarily
equate to low-income patients receiving affordable prescriptions.
This circles back to the high costs associated with bringing new
drugs into the market.
247
Although generic drugs are an option,
this would not necessarily equate to the same quality as brand-
name products, rendering patients optionless.
If a beneficiary chose “PAP A” instead of “PAP B” solely
because the beneficiary knew “PAP A” received donations from
“X Pharmaceuticals,” then courts can proceed to the second
prong: Did the pharmaceutical donor know, or should it have
known, that, but for the donations, the beneficiary would not
have chosen to participate in that specific PAP? This second
prong targets the heart of the AKS’s intent requirement. Factors
that need to be met in order to satisfy this prong include: (1) the
donor has knowledge that by making a donation to the PAP, it
is influencing a beneficiary’s decision to participate in that PAP;
(2) the donor has knowledge that the beneficiary is participating
in that PAP specifically because of its contributions; and (3) the
donor has knowledge that by the beneficiary’s participation in
that PAP, it is inducing future sales through dependency. If all
three factors are met, the second prong would be satisfied. If
244
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both prongs are satisfied, then, and only then, should courts find
an AKS violation.
By determining the beneficiary’s intent as to why they
chose a certain PAP, it becomes easier to narrow down whether
or not the pharmaceutical donor meets the scienter requirement.
Accordingly, courts should first determine whether or not an
AKS violation exists before moving forward to the FCA violation,
in the context of government actions that allege violations of
both statutes. Similar to Columbia/HCA, courts should only
find a False Claims Act violation if the actual claim itself was
false or fraudulent.
248
CONCLUSION
The direct causal link analysis provides a thorough means
of determining whether or not a health care professional violated
the AKS. Analyzingwhy the beneficiary chose a specific PAP, and
whether the reason was related to a pharmaceutical donation,
narrows the AKS’s “knowing[ ] and willful[ ] ” element.
249
Although the government could argue that the heightened burden
will hinder investigations (and prosecutions), it is essential that
prosecutors clear this hurdle in order to accurately show that
pharmaceutical donors did in fact violate the AKS.
The court must take into consideration the policy
argument for this proposal: that PAPs address the public health
care crisis in our country. The amount of money the United
States spends on health care is alarming when compared to how
much other nations spend.
250
CMS estimates the United States
will spend $5.96 trillion on health care by 2027.
251
Prescription
drug spending is projected to increase by an average of over six
percent per year during the next decade.
252
Since PAPs attempt to resolve this issue, it is vital for
courts to weigh these facts against the risk that donors may
violate the AKS. When prosecutors circumvent the intent
requirements under the AKS and pursue action through the FCA,
248
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it is detrimental to the beneficiary who relied on that PAP for
support and access to the necessary prescription drug. By
narrowing the AKS using the direct causal link analysis, the
government will have a harder time proving FCA violations,
which are distinct from violations of the AKS. Moreover, this new
test can be utilized so that courts can protect the beneficiaries
Congress had in mind when the AKS was developed.
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